Decentralization as ability to adapt by Birner, J.
  
 
Decentralization as ability to adapt
Citation for published version (APA):
Birner, J. (1995). Decentralization as ability to adapt. (METEOR research memorandum; No. 020).
Maastricht: METEOR, Maastricht University School of Business and Economics.
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/1995
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
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1 Introduction
The issues of centralization and decentralization are not new in
the history of economic and social theory, but lessons from the
past tend to be forgotten. I will here discuss some insights of
one of the greatest economic and social theorists of this
century, F.A. Hayek. Until not so long ago, Hayek's work was
almost completely unknown, and the few who knew it were only
acquainted with his later writings on social and political
philosophy. Hayek's economics remained in the shadow that was
cast over it when his one-time opponent Keynes carried the
quarter century after the publication of the General Theory in
1936. In this contribution I will show that Hayek's work contains
the resources for coming to grips with the problems of
centralization and decentralization that are now facing the
formerly socialist societies in Eastern Europe. Hayek's technical
economics of the 1920s, '30s and '40s will be discussed first.
Then I will summarize Hayek's arguments in the debate on a
socialist economy, and show how they were generalized into a
theory of society. In his later work on the emergence and
evolution of social institutions and their relations within
society as a whole, decentralized decision making occupies a
central position. Hayek's ideas in this domain were shaped by his
cognitive psychology, his earliest contribution to the sciences
of man. Various Hayekian ideas will be linked to those in other
domains with the purpose of examining how we may  shed more light
on some pressing problems of social organization.
2 Economic planning
2.1 Planning versus the market?
The difference between socialist and capitalist economies is
usually discussed in terms of planning versus the market. But
already in the first half of the 1930s Hayek argued that this is
a false dichotomy. Hayek had discussed planning in terms which
land us right in the middle of the issues of centralization and
decentralization. He observed that when analyzing an economic
system the relevant question is not whether or not planning takes
place. That question is misguided, for planning takes place in
every economic system. All economic agents make plans. The
relevant question is who is in effective control of the process
of making and carrying out the plans. Is it a central planning
bureau, or are they the individual decision makers? Economic
systems differ according to the extent to which the planning
process is centralized.  This way of formulating the problem has1
far-reaching consequences. If these had been recognized 50 years
2ago, economics might have been an entirely different discipline.
Economists, instead of limping along on the crutches of static
models when covering dynamic paths, might have developed dynamic
models much earlier, they might have recognized the role of
expectations much earlier, and instead of dealing with
representative agents they might have started analyzing co-
ordination problems. For all of these elements are closely
related to the way in which Hayek models the planning process.
2.2 Plan, equilibrium and time
Starting from the idea of an plan, Hayek proceeds to construct
a dual concept of equilibrium (Hayek, 1928). It comprises both
the equilibrium of the individual and that of the economic system
as a whole. For an individual Hayek defines equilibrium  as the
state in which the data of his economic plan correspond to his
expectations (ibid., p. 38-9). The data are the individual's own
preferences and the plans of other individuals. Or rather the
actions undertaken as a consequence of these plans and as
perceived by other individual planners. When the perceived
actions are in accordance with the actions as expected by
everybody, no-one's expectations are falsified. Hence, no-one has
an incentive to change his plan. The plans of all individuals are
consistent with one another. In other words, they are co-
ordinated, and the economic system as a whole is in equilibrium.
This dual formulation of equilibrium applies both to a centrally-
directed economy and a market system. 
Equilibrium is a relation between actions, and the actions of
an individual follow one another in time. Every individual
compares the actual level of the satisfaction of his needs with
the desired one. In his evaluation he includes the means
available to satisfy his needs. Time separates the actual state
of affairs from the desired one. Hence every plan involves a time
interval, and there is no plan without time (Hayek, 1937, p. 36-
7). Hayek's way of modelling equilibrium entails that equilibrium
analysis is not restricted to a static or a stationary system.
Whether the economy is stationary, grows, or shrinks depends on
the expectations of the individuals of which the system is made
up (ibid., p. 41). If every economic agent expects a particular
rate of growth, equilibrium is preserved as long as there are no
signals that are inconsistent with these expectations.
Equilibrium does not mean the immutability of objective data, but
the fulfillment of subjective expectations.
2.3 Disequilibrium
Plans are based on knowledge and expectations. A change in the
expectations of some planner will lead him to change his course
of action. This will generate signals that change the
informational input of other planners. A dynamic theory is needed
to describe the processes that operate in the system after the
state of equilibrium has been disturbed. During the 1930s Hayek
developed such a theory to explain business cycles. Individuals
base their actions on perceived prices, i.e., money prices. If,
3however, changes in the money supply do not keep exact pace with
changes in the real relative scarcities of goods and services,
perceived money prices do not correspond to real relative prices.
According to Hayek, credit money is a systematic source of
disturbances, and these may be aggravated by occasional monetary
interventions by governments. As a consequence of these
disturbances, individuals take the wrong consumption and
investment decisions. This causes changes in the structure of
capital and production that do not correspond to changes in real
intertemporal relative scarcities. It is not until the output
that is produced by the changed production structure is
confronted with the demand by consumers that it is discovered
that there is a mismatch. The structure of production is re-
adapted, which involves capital destruction and unemployment. The
result is a series of cyclical movements in the level of
investment. Hayek spent most of the 1930s to work out the
capital-theoretic foundations of his theory of industrial
fluctuations. This culminated in the publication of Pure Theory
of Capital in 1941.2
Implicit in Hayek's business cycle theory is a theory of social
learning. The changes in the structure of production impose
constraints on the individuals' possibilities for realizing their
plans. When running up against these constraints they learn that
their plans cannot be realized - the hard way.  Due to the3
locality of individual perception (or the existence of
distributed, limited knowledge), a learning process is needed to
force individuals to do what they would have chosen to do had
they been in a position to take the correct decisions to begin
with. This process is a social learning process in that
constraints that emerge out of the interaction of individuals
force individuals to adapt their plans. It is in this sense that
the system 'knows' more than the individuals of which it
consists.
2.4 Socialism
After the resounding success of Keynes' General Theory, Hayek
started to withdraw from analytical economics. In so far as he
was still remembered, it was for his contributions to the debate
on the feasibility of socialism. Even so, his arguments did not
play any part in the analysis of centrally-planned economies
until recently. For the purposes of the debate of the 1930s Hayek
defined socialism as central planning by the government.  His4
criticism of a socialist economy is that it is informationally
inefficient in three ways. First, the millions of individuals who
together make up an economy know their own specific circumstances
in quite some detail. However, a centrally-planned economy lacks
the means of collecting all these individual bits and pieces of
information. Second, under a system of centralized decision
making there are no incentives for individuals to discover new
opportunities. And third, even if a central planning bureau had
the means of collecting all relevant information, the
computational demands would supersede the capacities of even the
fastest computers. Although in the debate Hayek had concentrated
on the economic arguments, he had made it clear that this was too
4narrow a perspective. His subsequent development may be seen as
an attempt to supplement the economic arguments against a
socialist economy with arguments about the social framework of
an economy.
3 From economics to theory of society
Though forgotten by others, the basic messages of Hayek's
economics were not lost forever. For after Keynes' victory, Hayek
proceeded to develop a theory of society and of social
institutions which is a generalization and an elaboration of his
ideas about the mechanisms that regulate an economy. Even though
these later theories never reach the heights of analytical
sophistication of his economics, they contain enough that is of
interest for the study of centralization and decentralization
today. In a series of books and articles, Hayek developed his
ideas about social learning and the evolution of institutions and
the way in which markets and competition function.5
'Individualism True and False' of 1945 (ITF)  is a focal point6
in the generalization of Hayek's thought from the domain of
economics to that of social theory. ITF works out the
consequences of the theory of society of the philosophers of the
Scottish Enlightenment. According to Hayek, 'its basic contention
is (...) that there is no other way toward an understanding of
social phenomena but through our understanding of individual
actions directed toward other people and guided by their expected
behavior.' (ITF, p. 6).
The individualism of the Scottish philosophers has to be
distinguished from the so-called individualism of the Cartesian
school, which is usually referred to as rationalism. This is why
Hayek calls the true individualism of the Scottish Enlightenment
anti-rationalism.
'The antirationalistic approach, which regards man not as a
highly rational and intelligent but as a very irrational and
fallible being, whose individual errors are corrected only in
the course of a social process, and which aims to make the best
of a very imperfect material, is probably the most
characteristic feature of English individualism.' (ITF, p. 8-9)
This insight is due to Mandeville. True individualism is
closely connected to classical political economy. The great
discovery of the classical economists was that 'many of the
institutions on which human achievements rest have arisen and are
functioning without a designing and directing mind (...) and that
the spontaneous collaboration of free men often creates things
which are greater than their individual minds can ever fully
comprehend.' (ITF, p. 7)
Contrary to the pseudo-individualism of the rationalists and
social engineers, 'true individualism is the only theory which
can claim to make the formation of spontaneous social products
intelligible' (ITF, p. 10), and it 'believes (...) that, if left
free, men will often achieve more than individual human reason
could design or foresee.' (ITF, p. 10-11).
These ideas were applied to the domain of politics, where they
5were used for designing 'a system under which bad men can do
least harm.' (ITF, p. 11).  But true individualism is more than7
a political doctrine. It is a theory of society as a whole. 
Underlying this theory of society is 
'a view which in general rates rather low the place which
reason plays in human affairs, which contends that man has
achieved what he has in spite of the fact that he is only
partly guided by reason, and that his individual reason is very
limited and imperfect... One might even say that the former is
the product of an acute consciousness of the limitations of the
individual mind which induces an attitude of humility toward
the impersonal and anonymous social process by which
individuals help to create things greater than they know
(...).' (ITF, p. 8)
Such a theory needs to find an answer to the question of what
keeps a society together. The answer is that social cohesion is
a matter of an adequate institutional framework, one, moreover,
which does not rely for its operation on the application of
outside force: 'The great concern of the great individualist
writers was indeed to find a set of institutions by which man
could be induced, by his own choice and from the motives which
determined his ordinary conduct, to contribute as much as
possible to the need of all others (...).' (ITF, p. 12-13)
Two central ideas mark Hayek's transition from economics to the
theory of society. One concerns 'the constitutional limitation
of man's knowledge and interests, the fact that he cannot know
more than a tiny part of the whole of society and that therefore
all that can enter into his motives are the immediate effects
which his actions will have in the sphere he knows.' (ITF, p. 14)
The other idea is the description of social institutions as
problem solvers. Social institutions solve the problem of
complexity, a problem that Hayek came to address in more general
terms in his philosophy of science of the late 1950s and early
1960s.  The philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment had argued8
that institutions are capable of performing tasks that are far
too complex for individual human minds. Following their ideas,
Hayek sees social institutions as undesigned, spontaneously grown
interaction patterns, or rules, that by discovering and
coordinating dispersed knowledge reduce the complexity facing
individuals with limited knowledge and thus allow their actions
to be coordinated. These rules are largely implicit in that they
contain the accumulated tacit knowledge of past generations.
4 Cognitive and social systems
4.1 Learning and rationality as social phenomena
That the transition of Hayek to social philosophy involves a
generalization of his ideas on economics, is confirmed by what
Hayek says in ITF: 'What the economists understood for the first
time was that the market as it had grown up was an effective way
of making man take part in a process more complex and extended
than he could comprehend and that it was through the market that
6he was made to contribute to "ends which were no part of his
purpose."' (ITF, p. 14-5)
Hayek acknowledges that these economists had found a theory of
social learning. The belief in a theory of social learning is
consistent with the idea that rationality is a social phenomenon.
 
'The true basis of [the individualist's] argument is that
nobody can know who knows best and that the only way by which
we an find out is through a social process in which everybody
is allowed to try and see what he can do. The fundamental
assumption, here as elsewhere, is the unlimited variety of
human gifts and skills and the consequent ignorance of any
single individual of most of what is known to all the others
members of society taken together. Or, to put this fundamental
contention differently, human Reason, with a capital R, does
not exist in the singular, as given or available to any
particular person, as the rationalist approach seems to assume,
but must be conceived as an interpersonal process in which
anyone's contribution is tested and corrected by others.' (ITF,
p. 15)
This process generates the tacit knowledge which makes society
function, and this tacit knowledge is embodied in a particular
institutional structure. Obstructing the spontaneous interaction
of individuals hampers the growth of this type of knowledge:
'[the] desire to make everything subject to rational control, far
from achieving the maximal use of reason, is rather an abuse of
reason based on a misconception of its powers, and in the end
leads to a destruction of that free interplay of many minds on
which the growth of reason nourishes itself.' (Hayek, 1964, p.
93). 
4.2 Cognitive psychology and social theory
In 1920, at the age of 21, Hayek had written a manuscript that
contains the theory of cognitive psychology which was not
published until 1952, in an extended version, as The Sensory
Order (SO).  I will discuss Hayek's psychology because it is9
closely linked to his later theory of society. 
Hayek assumes that there are two 'orders' in which the human
mind arranges the objects in the world: the physical order, which
classifies external events as similar or different according to
whether they produce similar or different other external events;
and the sensory order, which classifies events according to their
sensory properties. In contrast to Ernst Mach, Hayek holds that
there is no simple one-to-one correspondence between the elements
of the two orders. This criticism of Mach was the reason why
Hayek developed his cognitive psychology (cp. De Vries, 1994).
Events which appear to our senses to be of the same kind, may be
different in the physical order, and the other way around. The
relation between the sensory order of the human mind (the
'microcosm') and the physical order of external events (the
'macrocosm') is the central problem of SO.
The principal tenet of the book, which also constitutes its
7main difference with other psychological theories, is that
'the sensory (or other mental) qualities are not in some manner
originally attached to, or an original attribute of, the
individual physiological impulses, but that the whole of these
qualities is determined by the system of connexions by which
the impulses can be transmitted from neuron to neuron; that it
is thus the position of the individual impulses or group of
impulses in the whole system of such connexions which gives it
its distinct quality; that this system of connexions is
acquired in the course of the development of the species and
the individual by a kind of 'experience' or 'learning'; and
that it reproduces therefore at every stage of its development
certain relationships existing in the physical environment
between the stimuli evoking the impulses.' (SO, 2.49)
There are no pure sense data or facts, but all facts are
embedded in a complex of relations to other facts, which we may
call, in the terminology of SO, a 'map'. From this map, which
serves as a kind of first approximation, more permanent sets of
classifications are formed. Hayek calls these 'models'.
'It is (...) the process of multiple classification which
builds the model. What we have before called the 'map', the
semi-permanent apparatus of classification, provides the
different generic elements from which the models of particular
situations are built. The term 'map', which suggests a sort of
schematic picture of the environment is thus really somewhat
misleading. What the apparatus of classification provides is
more a sort of inventory of the kind of things of which the
world is built up, a theory of how the world works rather than
a picture of it. It would be better described as a construction
set from which the models of particular situations are built.'
(SO, 5.89)
These models are not complete representations of the world. 
That it is possible for the mind to build representations of
the physical order from a set of models that is necessarily
limited, is due to the accidental fact that the structure of the
world is 'redundant', to use Herbert Simon's term:   10
'It is (...) no more than a fortunate accident that the
different events in the macrocosm are not fully interrelated
to any significant degree, but that as a rule it is possible
to base predictions of certain kinds of events on a mere
selection of a totality of events.' (SO, 5.90)
Hayek's psychology is an evolutionary theory. The idea that the
human mind evolves as part  of man's struggle for survival
dictates the problem: 'Our task is (..) to show in what sense it
is possible that within parts of the macrocosm a microscosm may
be formed which reproduces certain aspects of the macrocosm and
through this will enable the substructure of which it forms part
to behave in a manner which will assist its continued existence.'
(SO, 5.78) The mind works through a continuous process of
classification and reclassification of sense impressions and the
8classifications formed from them. This takes place in the central
nervous system, which is involved in a continuous process of
self-organization. This leads to an ever more complex set of
classifications in the shape of increasingly intricate patterns
of connections between neurons. This evolutionary process is what
the working of the mind consists of. To perceive is to classify
sense impressions along neural routes that become more and more
firmly established, and that in the end no longer have to be
adapted any further. In a term that has become common with the
work of Simon, we may call these routines.
This argument in Hayek's cognitive psychology has a parallel
in his theory of society. A developed society has to a large
extent become 'routinized'. This is a characteristic of what
Hayek calls the 'extended order' of society. The spontaneously
evolved social institutions contain a surplus of tacit over
explicit knowledge. As Keizer writes: 'Civilization advanced by
increasing the number of operations mankind performs without
thinking about them. (Keizer, 1994, p. 216). We may observe that
this is a mixed blessing. On the one hand, the advanced level of
routinization liberates much social energy for creative
innovation of the institutional structure. On the other hand, the
progress of routinization also makes it ever harder to change
what has grown. Hayek argues that any intervention in these
institutions may have unintended consequences, ones that may
eventually lead to their total destruction.11
This parallel between Hayek's psychology and his theory of
society is not an isolated instance. There are many more
homeomorphisms. This is not so strange as it might appear if one
keeps the following in mind. In Hayek's work, the theme of
communication is a crucial intermediate step between his
economics and his later theory of society as a whole: 'Economics
and Knowledge' of 1937, with a later follow-up in 'The Use of
Knowledge in Society' of 1945, and 'Competition as a Discovery
Procedure' of 1968. In his contributions to the socialism debate
communication failures are crucial, as is the case with his
business cycle theory. The response of an economy to these
communication failures constitutes a process of social learning.
Also of relevance is that for the better part of his active
intellectual life, Hayek was looking for solutions to the problem
of explaining collective effects from individualist premises.
Thus, a major part of Hayek's efforts in developing his economics
during the 1930s went into reducing the macro-economic phenomenon
of the business cycle to the micro-economic theory of rational
choice. The same type of problem is central to his investigations
in psychology, viz. finding the relation between the microcosm
of the human mind and the macrocosm of external events. Hayek's
resuming work on his cognitive psychology made him see the role
of collective effects, and more in particular social
institutions, in a new light.
'When I look back, it seems all to have begun, nearly thirty
years ago, with an essay on 'Economics and Knowledge' in which
I examined what seemed to me some of the central difficulties
of pure economic theory. Its main conclusion was that the task
of economic theory was to explain how an overall order of
economic activity was achieved which utilized a large amount
9of knowledge which was not concentrated in one mind but existed
only as the separate knowledge of thousands or millions of
different individuals. But it was still a long way from this
to an adequate insight into the relations between the abstract
rules which the individual follows in his action, and the
abstract overall order which is formed as a result of his
responding, within the limits imposed upon him by those
abstract rules, to the concrete particular circumstances which
he encounters.' (Hayek, 1965 91-2)
And in the third volume of Law, Legislation and Liberty of 1979
Hayek remarks:
'the work on it [SO] has helped me greatly to clear my mind on
much that is very relevant to social theory. My conception of
evolution, of a spontaneous order and of the methods and limits
of our endeavours to explain complex phenomena have been formed
largely in the course of the work on that book. As I was using
the work I had done in my student days on theoretical
psychology in forming my views on the methodology of the social
science, so the working out of my earlier ideas on psychology
with the help of what I had learnt in the social science helped
me greatly in all my later scientific development.' (p. 199,
n. 26)
4.3 A reliable system from unreliable parts
Hayek's argument that rationality is the property of a social
system, and that such a system is more stable and reliable than
a collection of unconnected rational individuals is reminiscent
of Simon's remark on the reliability of computers: 'The question
is how to build a reliable system from unreliable parts. (...)
We can cope with unreliability only by our manner of organizing
them.' Simon, 1969, p. 19). If we do not read Simon's 'organize'
in the sense of consciously creating a system, the above ideas
of Hayek and Simon amount to the same. This is no coincidence.
Simon is a cognitive psychologist and a pioneer in linking the
analysis of human cognition and computer science. In that field,
neural network theory plays a prominent part. Hayek's SO was one
of the sources from which of neural network theory was
developed.  These common roots explain why there are often such12
striking resemblances between neural networks and Hayek's
spontaneous-order model of society. To give just two instances,
McClelland et.al. (1986, p. 3) answer the question 'What makes
people smarter than machines?' by observing that 'people are
smarter than today's computers because the brain employs a basic
computational architecture that is more suited to deal with a
central aspect of the natural information processing tasks that
people are so good at.' (ibid.) Hayek's answer to the analogous
question in the domain of society is that it is the social
structure that is important, i.e., the interaction patterns which
make markets so much more efficient than the essentially
sequential and hub-like processes and structure of central
planning.
Another instance is the modelling of learning in neural networks
10
as the strengthening of connections between neurons. This has its
counterpart in Hayek's idea that successful interaction rules
will be repeated more often than less successful ones and become
embodied in the tacit knowledge of social institutions. Another
connection-strength model is to be found in sociological network
theory, which will be discussed below.
4.4 Incentives
In his contribution to the debate on socialism, Hayek did not
elaborate the problem of incentives as requisites for the working
of the market. Ludwig von Mises did. Mises defined socialism as
state ownership of the means of production and his criticism
focuses on the absence of private property rights that
characterize a socialist society. As individuals neither gain nor
lose as a direct consequence of their own decisions, they have
no incentives to balance costs and revenues optimally. This
entails that under socialism no real scarcity prices are
established, which in their turn are a necessary ingredient for
rationally calculating decision makers. Without private property
there is no rational calculation.
On the level of the social system, incentives play a part which
is not related to rational calculation but to the cohesion of a
social system as a whole in the face of the existence of opposing
interests. Adequate incentives are required for maintaining
social cohesion; individuals in a society must be motivated to
co-operate. For a particular institutional framework to be
stable, a mechanism is needed through which it reproduces itself
over time. Marina Bianchi has formulated this problem as the
following paradox: when interests are opposed 'private interests
cannot be generalized without losses, and what can be generalized
(moral codes) does not obey private motivations.' (Bianchi, 1994,
p. 243). Neither Mises nor Hayek explain how opposing interests
can be reconciled. Unless this problem is solved, a system in
which individual knowledge and actions are co-ordinated and
rational calculation takes place is not even likely to arise, or
if it arises, is not likely to be stable. The analysis of
prisoner-dilemma situations has made it clear that in situations
in which everyone rationally pursues his own private interests
and searches his own individual gain, no social rules may arise
without generating mutual losses. Even in the situation of a
repeated prisoners' dilemma there is no guarantee of a co-
operative outcome, i.e. a stable system of social rules. And even
when an agreement to co-operate should arise spontaneously, some
enforcement rules have to be discovered for the interaction
pattern to be stable: 'without an evolved and continuously
adjusting system of enforcement rules, conflictual interests will
prevail.' (ibid., p. 244).
Bianchi argues that Hayek's theory of competition as a dynamic
discovery procedure contains the elements for an explanation of
both the coordination and the incentive effects. Hayek thinks of
competition as a discovery process which is instrumental in co-
ordinating individual actions. However, competition has another
function, too. It provides the incentives for outcompeting
rivals. This may have positive external effects.
11
'Competition is not only the place for arbitrage gains, for
"stepping in" and grasping first an opportunity (...), but also
searching for, and the means of rewarding, new forms of gain.
(...) Vices are not replaced by virtues; they remain vices,
only they become more sociable in their effects. Nothing
guarantees that this form of socialization proceeds steadily
and irreversibly (...) But the learning procedure that is
implied in the process will provide the flexibility for
adjustments and corrections. The meaning of "order" changes;
it is not a state of affairs, but a process; not a correct
state, but a corrigible one.' (ibid., p. 245)
The appropriate institutional framework for the market is as
much object of continuous discovery as the market opportunities
themselves:
'On the one hand, a complex system of moral codes, rules of
fairness, as well as an articulated system of punishments for
the violators, has to be continuously discovered and adjusted.
On the other hand, the search for competitive gains must always
find new channels. In this different setting the market game,
Hayek's game of catallaxy not only teaches the players how to
transform the enemy into friend (...), it also provides the
incentive structure to discover and reward more social ways of
"defection"'. (ibid., 246)
5 System and individual
5.1 Levels of analysis
In the above, the possibility was mentioned that an entire social
structure is more reliable than the individual units of which it
is made up. Closely related to this scientific question is the
methodological problem of the basic unit of analysis, or the
correct level of aggregation. In his early work Hayek was a
staunch defender of methodological individualism. However, he
gradually abandoned the individualist methodology for a holistic
one, probably under the growing influence of evolutionary ideas
in his social theory. After The Constitution of Liberty of 1960,
the evolution and selection of institutions are no longer
described in terms of a mechanism that are consistent with
methodological individualism. Hayek became alienated, so to
speak, from the individualism of the Scottish philosophers, which
he had held up as a shining example. His later theory of the
evolution of institutions relies on a holistic concept of group
selection. This is a vague notion that has kept Hayek from
solving the problem what incentives it would take to make
individuals adopt rules that, though conflicting with their self-
interest, have survival value for the social order as a whole.
Bianchi returns to Hayek's former individualism. She retains
the core of his evolutionary ideas on social institutions without
the conservative conclusions Hayek himself drew from them. She
shows that there is no need for holistic elements such as group
selection. She improves on Hayek on several more issues. She
explains learning behaviour, which Hayek had not addressed, in
12
terms of the incentives provided by the prospect of competitive
gains. Moreover, she proposes a more satisfactory criterion for
measuring the selective evolutionary advantage of a particular
social system. It is the ability to learn which constitutes a
selective evolutionary advantage of a society instead of the
criterion which Hayek puts forward in his Fatal Conceit, which
is the number of people  a society can keep alive. Bianchi's is
a process criterion which is more consistent with Hayek's
rejection, in is earlier work, of end state criteria. But the
main advantage of Bianchi's proposal of linking social selection
to learning is that it may assist us in finding ways of
implementing a selection mechanism that may benefit all members
of a society. This will be elaborated below.
5.2 Social learning
There are two main aspects to the ability to learn in a social
structure. One is that of discovery, the other of the
transmission of knowledge. Theories about these aspects come in
two varieties: ones that emphasize structural mechanisms, and
others that analyze these aspects in terms of the actions of
individuals.
A 'structural' theory of discovery can be found in Mises'
discussion of the role of the entrepreneur in his contribution
to the debate on socialism.  Mises stresses the importance of
positions in a social structure: 'Like Plato's philosophers, the
directors so appointed [i.e. in public enterprises] may well be
the wisest and best of their kind, but they cannot be merchants
in their posts as leaders of a socialist society, even if they
should have been previously.' (Mises, 1920, p. 121). This is
because '[a] merchant's qualities are not the property of a
person depending on inborn aptitude, nor are they acquired by
studies in a commercial school or by working in a commercial
house.... The entrepreneur's commercial attitude arises from his
position in the economic process and is lost with its
disappearance.' (ibid.).
In a more sophisticated form we find a similar structural view
of entrepreneurship in Ronald Burt's Structural Holes; The Social
Structure of Competition. Burt models the economy as a network
of agents who are linked to one another. There may be connections
that are possible yet have not been realized. Burt calls these
'structural holes'. In this analysis,
'competition is a matter of relation, not player attributes.
The structural hole argument escapes the debilitating social
science practice of using player attributes for explanation.
The relations that intersect to create structural holes give
a player entrepreneurial opportunities to get high rates of
return. The player in whom the relations intersect - black,
white, female, male, old, young, rich, poor - is irrelevant to
the explanation. Competition is not about being a player with
certain physical attributes; it is about securing productive
relationships. Physical attributes are a correlate, not a
cause, of competitive success. Holes can have different effect
for people with different attributes or for organizations of
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different kinds, but these differences in effect occur because
the attributes and organization forms are correlated with
different positions in social structure. The manner in which
a structural hole is an entrepreneurial opportunity for
information benefits and control benefits is the bedrock
explanation that carries across player attributes, populations,
and time.' (Burt, 1992, p. 4)
Notice that Burt adds to the Hayekian theme of information13
that of control. This opens the way to an analysis of dominance
and power in markets that is lacking in Hayek.
The transmission aspect of social learning involves the ability
of that structure to transmit information efficiently and without
distortion. This is a topic that has been studied extensively in
sociological network theory, and more in particular in the
tradition of which Mark Granovetter is a prominent theorist. In
what is known as the strength-of-weak-ties argument one may see
an elaboration of the idea that is to be found in Hayek that the
transmission of information has to do with the overlapping
domains of perception of individuals.  In network theory this is14
known as connectivity. I derive the following version of the
argument from Flap, 1976.
The basic assumption of the argument is that differences in
communication behaviour are caused by differences in social
networks. In their turn, the characteristics of networks are
defined in terms of the attitudes of the individuals of which the
network is made up. individuals have various types of ties with
one another. The intensity of the ties determines both the nature
and the frequency of the interactions. Ties are distinguished in
terms of the differences between individuals as similar or
homophilous and dissimilar or heterophilous. It is assumed that
homophily is correlated positively with strong ties and
heterophily with weak ties. Another dimension of interactions or
relationships is their multiplicity, i.e. the number of different
social roles in which individuals interact. Multiplicity is
positively correlated to strength. So we arrive at the hypothesis
that the greater the number of social roles in which agents
interact, the stronger their ties. 
Then Flap introduces the notion of cognitive dissonance, with
intensity and frequency as dimensions. These are linked to the
strength of ties as follows. The stronger an individual's
emotions, the stronger the dissonance; the stronger the
dissonance, the more will information be distorted; the stronger
the ties, the stronger the emotions; hence, the stronger the
ties, the more does information become distorted. The frequency
with which information is distorted is introduced in a similar
way. The more often new information is offered, the more often
will there be cognitive dissonance; the more frequently there is
dissonance, the more often will there be distortion of
information; the stronger the ties, the less often will there be
dissonance; hence, the stronger the ties, the less frequently
will information be distorted.
Taken all together, these steps lead to the prediction that in
the case of homophilous or strong ties, more limited information
which is strongly distorted will be distributed less frequently
over fewer agents. Finally, the openness of a network (i.e.,
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measure in which it consists of elements with weak ties) is
linked to the open-mindedness of agents (agents are more tolerant
of cognitive dissonance). Thus one arrives at the following
theoretical prediction. The more a society consists of networks
that are characterized by weak ties, the faster will more
comprehensive and less distorted information be distributed over
more agents who are more tolerant. Conversely, the more a society
is characterized by closed or strong-tied networks, the more
slowly will less comprehensive and more distorted information be
distributed over fewer agents and agents who are less tolerant.
The above version of the strength-of-weak-ties argument offers
a fruitful generalization of Hayek's argument about markets and
the price system as communication mechanisms. This deserves more
comment than I can devote to it here, but I will just draw the
attention to the element of cognitive dissonance. Hayek defines
the equilibrium of the individual as the state of affairs in
which the individual's expectations are not falsified. This can
straightforwardly be reformulated as the absence of cognitive
dissonance. The strength-of-weak-ties argument was originally
developed for labour markets. It is strange that with one recent
exception it has never been generalized to an analysis of the
functioning of all markets.  What it has been applied to, in15
sociology, are matters of social stability. According to the
Granovetter approach, social relationships become more stable if
individuals enter into multiple and weak social relationships
with one another. This would explain why the communist societies
of Eastern Europe that had long since gone bankrupt in reality
functioned tolerably well. Their citizens entertained many more
relationships with one another than the official blueprint of
society showed and allowed.
5.3 Structure versus individual?
Both Burt and Bianchi describe a social discovery process, but
the objects of discovery differ. Burt emphasizes the purely
structural phenomena of missing links or 'holes', which are
bridged by entrepreneurs. Bianchi speaks of new forms of
interaction. These have to do with the rules and motivations
governing the behaviour of individuals, from which Burt abstracts
on purpose (Burt, 1992, p. 35). In explaining competition it does
not seem necessary to make this mutually exclusive choice between
individuals' characteristics and their structural position. As
Hayek observes in his writings on rule-guided behaviour,
individuals have certain dispositions which have to be activated.
A rule is a disposition (Hayek, 1969, p. 43), a 'movement pattern
(...), ordering principle' (Hayek, 1963, p. 45), 'a statement by
which a regularity of the conduct of individuals can be
described' (Hayek, 1976a, p. 67). A rule can be conceived of as
a model of behaviour or a law of individual behaviour (cp. also
Hayek, 1963a, p. 37). Rules are no sufficient conditions for
behaviour; they have to be activated by 'a particular external
stimulus or (...) an internal drive' (Hayek, 1963a, p. 69). The
behaviour stops when the stimulus ceases to be operative. In a
social system the original stimulus may be deactivated by co-
ordination.
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'The orderliness of the system of actions will in general show
itself in the fact that actions of the different individuals
will be so coordinated, or mutually adjusted to each other,
that the result of their actions will remove the initial
stimulus or make inoperative the drive which has been the cause
of activity.' (Hayek, 1963a, p. 69)
If one realizes that the sort of stimulus an individual
receives will be largely dependent on his location in the social
structure (which influences his perception of signals), this
seems like a perfectly satisfactory way of integrating
(individual) function with (position in a) structure. This is
consistent with the methodologically individualist Granovetter
tradition.
6 Past before present
6.1 Prediction and stability
Bianchi's message of social order as the ability to learn is
reminiscent of the pre-conservative Hayek of Constitution of
Liberty of 1960. In that book Hayek argues that social innovation
is necessary for a social order to survive. The creation of new
rules that compete for the favour of society keeps that society
from becoming fossilized in its old ways when the environment
changes and calls for new ways to cope with problems of
complexity. But how to create the conditions that favour
competition? Or more generally, how can we implement the idea of
social order as ability to learn? It would be contrary both to
the nature of the competition process and to the evolutionary
spirit of Hayek's social theory to think that this can be
achieved by imposing a detailed set of conditions.
Hayek's methodology offers some guidance. In the 1950s and
1960s Hayek explicitly dealt with problems of complexity, both
as a phenomenon in the social world and as a problem for the
theory of science. He argues as follows. Even if we, as social
scientists, know the laws that are relevant for predicting social
situations, we cannot know all the relevant initial conditions.
Therefore, detailed predictions are beyond our reach. This
implies that detailed social engineering is out of the question.
The most we can attain is that we may sometimes, when we know the
relevant regularities, predict that particular global situations
cannot occur together. Particularly in his later work, after
1960, Hayek is rather radical in the way in which he interprets
this. Instead of thinking in terms of trade-offs, for example
between more and less centralized planning, he constructs pairs
of mutually exclusive states of the world. This is related to the
fact that Hayek conflates the notion of unintended with that of
unpredictable. This is noticed by Plant,  who argues that16
whereas income redistribution may have unintended consequences
for the functioning of the market, these consequences are not
necessarily unpredictable. This is all for the better because it
may be necessary for the introduction and the stability of a
market system to 'buy the loyalty' of those who are dissatisfied
with the outcome of the market process. Predicting the
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consequences of redistribution may help us determine the measure
to which incomes can be redistributed without destroying the
system. The 'solution' Hayek offers is a moral one. The only
thing we can do to preserve the market in the face of demands for
redistribution is to educate the individuals within a market
society into accepting that the outcomes of market processes may
not be just.
It is much more fruitful to formulate problems such as these
in more general terms. Constructing a theory that takes possible
trade-offs into account is an advance from a scientific point of
view as it leads to non ad-hoc explanations. For instance,
instead of asking why the introduction of some central planning
leads to complete centralization, one may ask if there exists a
stable mix between centralized and decentralized decision making.
If one reads Hayek's work in this way, several other trade-offs
may be found that are relevant for transition problems, such as
individual planning as compared to central planning, changing a
social structure according to a blueprint as compared to change
by spontaneous evolution. Underlying the latter is the more
general problem of the correct mix of conservatism and
innovation. Another possible trade-off may concern dispersed
knowledge which must be coordinated as compared to knowledge
which is more generally available and needs less coordination
Let me return to prediction and stability. There is a different
level on which predictability matters. For the participants in
social processes predictability is an important condition for
stability. To a certain extent this can be furthered by legal
measures. The co-ordination of knowledge without the resulting
'contracts' being enforceable would not work. The crux of small-
units capitalism is that there is a lot at stake for all the
decision making units when they enter into relationships with
others. The situation is typically not one of a one-shot
prisoners' dilemma (even though many small entrepreneurs behave
that way. According the Granovetter approach, relationships
become more stable if units enter into multiple relationships
with one another. This is another feature of a social framework
that one might conceivably enhance: make sure people encounter
each other in as great a number of different roles as possible.
This makes for more tolerance, more stability and more open
networks, hence for more opportunities for social learning.
6.2 Myths about markets
The discussion about the desirability and the feasibility of
introducing a decentralized market society in Eastern Europe has
been obscured by the habit of comparing actual centrally-planned
economies with an idealized market economy. Unfortunately, this
idealized picture is about all we have. We just do not know how
markets really work. The analysis of markets as it is conducted
by traditional mainstream economics is a travesty of
understanding. To begin with, they drew any teeth their theory
might have had by defining equilibrium tautologically as a state
of perfect information (cp. Hayek, 1937, p. 42). They ignored the
essentially dynamic character of competition by searching for
static conditions under which particular market forms
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(misleadingly referred to as various types of competition) may
exist. And they built models that pretended to give an
individualist behavioural foundation to an analysis of a market
system around a representative individual, thus excluding any
role for information, coordination, communication or the
organization of the economy. There is even no exchange.  But the17
feature of neoclassical Walrasian general equilibrium theory that
probably renders it most useless for understanding markets is
that it is based on the assumption of an interaction structure
that does not fit a market economy. As Kirman observes (Kirman,
1983), the structure of a Walrasian economy is star-shaped. All
transactions are modelled as being conducted via a central
auctioneer. This is the structure of a centrally-planned economy,
and it is paradoxical to apply this structure to a market
economy, which has the structure of a network of multiple
relations among individuals. Equally paradoxical is the fact that
the only economy to which the standard neoclassical model applies
straightforwardly is a centrally-directed dictator economy. It
is only in a centrally-planned economy, where allocation and
price formation is centralized, that the neoclassical allocation
mechanism applies in its full force.  But 'once we break away18
from the "star-like" structures of a classical economy with
central auctioneer, who trades with whom, and who passes
information to whom becomes very significant.' (Kirman, 1983, p.
107).
Paradox was turned into scandal when the millions of dollars the
West made available to help the former communist countries create
a market society were spent in the same West on hiring the
preachers of this sterile mainstream economic doctrine.
Given the centralized star structure such as a Walrasian or a
socialist economy, it is reasonable to assume that individuals
are connected by non-multiples, strong ties. The work of
Granovetter and others teaches us that from a communication
viewpoint such a social structure 'will be fragmented and
incoherent. New ideas will spread slowly, scientific endeavors
will be handicapped, and subgroups that are separated by race,
ethnicity, geography, or other characteristics will have
difficulty in reaching a modus vivendi.' (Granovetter, 1982, p.
106). This is in stark contrast to the virtues that the
neoclassical defenders of a market society claim for it. 
The weak-ties analysis also suggests an explanation for the
recent manifestations of ultra-nationalism in Eastern Europe.
Lacking a network consisting of weak ties, the central authority
of the communist societies needed a strong repressive apparatus
to suppress the forces counteracting cohesion. As soon as that
authority lacked the means for repression, many societies in the
East fragmented into sub-units.
In the above, I have defended the view that markets should be
considered as social networks. I now want to briefly draw the
attention to two other aspects of markets. First, markets, like
other social networks, are constructs. They are social
constructions in two senses. One is that markets only exist by
virtue of the beliefs of individuals; this is directly related
to the fact that the perception by an individual is partly a
result of his development, which in turn incorporates a learning
process. Hence, whether a particular market exists and is stable
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(i.e. reproduces itself ) is dependent on learning processes.19
This is of direct relevance to Eastern Europe. Unless people have
the opportunity to learn to play the social roles of which market
relations consist, no market society will be established. The
second sense in which markets are social constructions is that
they are the result of a historical process of development which
is in large part unplanned or spontaneous.  The fact that in20
such a process there may have been episodes of deliberate
intervention does not defuse this argument.21
The other feature of markets that I want to mention involves
the idea of collective or public goods. For their functioning and
stability markets rely on the existence of public goods such as
money and a legal framework.  Defenders of the idea that markets22
arise out of individuals' perfectly free pursuit of nothing but
their self interest are defending a myth. In so far as they
invoke Adam Smith as their patron saint, they should know better.
True, in The Wealth of Nations Smith focuses his analysis on self
interest as motivating human action. But he is also the author
of an earlier book, The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Its first
sentence is: 
"How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently
some principles in his nature, which interest him in the
fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him,
though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of
seeing it." (Smith, 1759, p. 47)
Smith develops the theory that disrespect for one's fellow
citizens makes a society unstable.
'Society may subsist among different men, as among different
merchants, from a sense of its utility, without any mutual love
or affection; and though no man in it should owe any
obligation, or be bound in gratitude to any other, it may still
be upheld by a mercenary exchange of good offices according to
an agreed valuation.
Society, however, cannot subsist among those who are at all
times ready to hurt and injure one another.' (Smith, 1759, p.
166)
In some former communist countries there are currently many
indications of a form of pirate capitalism under which partners
in market transactions only seek their own short term gain. These
instances show that Smith's important lesson still has to be
learned. Smith is opposed to the idea, which he attributes to
Mandeville, of man as only heeding his self interest in his
relationships with other men. Clearly, there is a tension between
Smith's criticism of Mandeville's idea of competition and
Bianchi's interpretation. According to Smith, a society could not
persist on the basis of a Mandevillean motivation of individuals.
Bianchi, on the other hand, stresses the discovery aspect of this
behaviour and argues that the learning process engendered by it
makes for a dynamic type of social stability. One way to resolve
this tension is to attribute to competitors the awareness that
they all benefit from keeping the broad institutional framework
intact which allows them to compete and benefit from others. 
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Thus, we have arrived at the second way in which collective
goods are involved: markets themselves are collective goods.
Markets emerge because at least two individuals find it in their
interest to start engaging in exchange. Whereas it is usually in
the interest of the original market partners to exclude others
from entering their own side of the market, it is equally in
their interest to invite others to enter the opposite side of the
market. Suppliers will try to keep other suppliers out but like
to be faced by more demanders, and the same is true of the demand
side. This is so provided those engaging in exchange understand
that it is in their interest to keep a particular market in
existence. Or, as Loasby observes, 
'Arrangements which facilitate transactions often create
externalities. They will almost always do so when the
arrangements are designed to create a continuing transaction
capability - in order words a market - which is accessible to
many.' (Loasby, 1994, p. 9).
This is part of the mechanism through which more and more
individuals become involved in the market. The external effect
of a newly established may may consist of the fact that it serves
as an example that can be imitated by others. Once individuals
stop behaving as one-shot maximizers, a market infrastructure may
establish itself where there was none before. These external
effects are a type of social amplifier, a mechanism that acts as
a generator of value. Not only will needs be satisfied that could
not be satisfied previous to the emergence of a market system,
new needs will be created as well. And whatever one's subjective
opinion of the intrinsic value of such newly discovered needs,
they open up opportunities for an increasing number of other
individuals to participate in the social game of value creation.
6.3 Stability and the past
A system in transition needs both change and stability. Social
institutions and the texture of institutions that make up a
society are such a complex whole of relationships and processes
that we are just beginning to understand how they work. Hayek
argues that evolved institutions constitute a stock of social
capital that it took a long time to accumulate. Applied to the
formerly communist societies this means that destroying the
habits and other institutions that have evolved over the last 75
years is a destruction of social capital that may have (and
already did have) disastrous consequences. The results of such
a long evolution cannot be abolished from one day to another.
Doing so would leave a society without any kind of stability, a
very dangerous situation. This is the mistake Gorbatsjov made.
Under the old structure there was at least some knowledge of the
sort of behaviour patterns one could expect. This explains why
in almost every formerly communist country the former communists
were re-elected in the first free elections. It was not because
the voters wanted communism back. All they wanted was some
stability. Given the alternatives, their voting behaviour is
entirely rational. Having some structure, however unsatisfactory,
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is better than having no structure at all. Under the old
structure there was at least some knowledge of the sort of
behaviour patterns one could expect.
The history of a society matters for its future development.
There is a division between on the one hand countries that have
within living memory had an entrepreneurial tradition and on the
other hand those that have been centrally ruled for much longer.
Transplanting a social system that has evolved and proven
satisfactory in one culture to another may have disastrous
consequences. The underlying traditions have to match. If we were
given the time for introducing changes in Eastern Europe at a
more prudent pace, we would first have to apply historical
analysis in order to discover what may be called the social
constants of the various societies. Social constants may be
defined as behaviour patterns that are resistant to change,
except perhaps in the long run. For instance, in Russia the
revolution of 1917 did not so much change the social structure
(which had been centralist for a long time under the czars) as
the ideology. Of course, over time, this ideology helped to
create a social structure that might not have evolved under the
czars, but this is something we will never know.
7 Conclusion: finding the boundaries of the controllable
If one wants to change, one has to start somewhere, and even in
an evolutionary framework respect for stability has to go hand
in hand with a vision on the goals we set out to achieve and the
means we can apply. It lies in the nature of the complex
evolutionary mechanism of society that the number of detailed
measures one can take, the number of variables one seeks to
control, is limited. The problem is to find the boundaries of the
controllable. Hayek is certainly correct in drawing attention to
the fact that what enters into this complex of problems is the
notion of unintended effects. But as we have seen, unintended
effects may to a certain extent be predictable. This creates a
space for some social engineering. The conservative radicalism
of Hayek's later work is unfounded, and an approach such as the
gradualism of Popper's Open Society is defensible on Hayekian
terms. It is in this light that one may try to implement
Bianchi's proposal and introduce a type of social framework which
favours the ability to learn. The creation of conditions under
which this is rendered most probable may benefit from the type
of empirical research that is done in sociological network
theory. Enhancing the probability that individuals will establish
and maintain weak ties will be conducive to the 'amendable
society' that Bianchi advocates. Such an open society has to be
supported by an adequate legal and political framework. In the
end, for the former communist countries it is not the
introduction of the market that is of the highest importance. It
is more important to find a system which is both more adapted to
each country's specific history and more adaptable to
unforeseeable future developments. It is likely that this is a
decentralized system, but insisting that it must be an exact copy
of the market society of the West is as dogmatic as the one-time
defence of centralized planning by Marxists.
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1. Cp. Hayek, 1945, para. 2.
2. His other main contributions to business cycle theory can
be found in Prices and Production and Profits, Interest and
Investment.
3. Thus Hayek uses the term "forced saving" to indicate a
situation in which
consumers cannot
fulfill their plans.
4. For a detailed discussion of the contributions by Hayek, and
of those by Mises, to the debate on socialism, cp. Keizer,
1994.
5. The most important early publications are the collection of
essays in Hayek, 1949, and Hayek, 1960. In his later work
Hayek is markedly more conservative in his conclusions. Cp.
Hayek, 1973, 1967, 1979, and Hayek, 1988.
6. The references in the text are to the edition in Hayek,
1949.
7. This is very similar to Popper's approach to social science.
Watkins has coined the term "negative utilitarianism" for
this.
8. Cp. for instance Hayek, 1955a, 1963, 1964 and 1967.
9. As the published version of (1952) contains the basic ideas
of the manuscript of 1920, all references will be to the
book.
10. Cp. Simon, 1968.
11. I observe once more that up to and including Constitution
of Liberty Hayek is more open to the possibility of 
intervening in social institutions than in his later work.
I will return to this in the paragraph 'Prediction and
stability' below.
12. Cp. for instance George, 1961, p. 112: 'The idea that the
human senses worked on a classification principle had 
previously been suggested by Hayek (1952), and Uttley was
able to build a simple classification system in hardware.'
Cp. also ibid., p. 319, and Rosenblatt, 1958, p. 92.
13. Burt does not refer to Hayek (nor to Mises).
14. Cp. Hayek, 1945, p. 86.
15. Granovetter has concentrated on the labour market. With the
exception of Burt, 1992, there have been no attempts to
Notes
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describe the functioning of markets in general in network
models. The present author is engaged in a research project
with that scope.
16. Cp. Plant, 1994.
17. Cp. Kirman, 1983. Cp. also Garretsen, 1994 and Van Zijp &
Visser, 1994.
18. Cp. Robinson, 1956, and also Hayek, 1941. This criticism
is a variant of the criticism of the representative-
individual model. Hayek starts with an idealized dictator-
led economy and then subsequently introduces more 
decentralized decision making. This makes that book 
compulsory reading for all those interested in issues of 
economic decentralization.
19. The problem of the reproduction of markets in such a
subjectivist contextis analyzed in White, 1988.
20. The word 'construction' must not be read as referring to a
deliberate action; this is equally the case with the first
sense. Contrary to the views of Mises and Hayek, it is not
necessary for networks to exist that actors be aware of
their attitudes.
21. Desai even argues that the free market society was the
deliberate creation of the English state. Less 
controversially, he observes that when the philosopher who 
is now almost universally hailed as the theorist of the free
market was writing, there was no market society yet. Smith's
arguments in favour of such a society were as theoretical
as are the arguments by Arrow and Debreu for the invisible
hand theorem. Cp. Desai, 1986.
22. Cp. for instance Desai, 1986.
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